OPTIMJACK: the Optimizely Web supply-chain attack
On 16 November 2026, an attacker wrote JavaScript into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web projects. Optimizely's CDN served the modified snippets as published. Report URI examined 1,611 known snippets and found the injected code in 188, belonging to approximately 178 organisations.1 Other reports give figures between 178 and 188.3,5 Named organisations include the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax.1
The access path has not been disclosed. Report URI stated that the CDN cache was not poisoned: the CDN served what it was given.1 The campaign was named by the researcher who first published captures of it.2
Timeline (UTC, 16 November)
- First injected code observed in the BBC's Optimizely snippet.
- TLS certificates begin issuing for the payload domain.
- Payload domain
1688360.ccregistered. track.jsfirst observed loading on bbc.com.- Zoom's snippet modified.
- Stolen cryptocurrency moved to exchanges.
- Card-skimming module added to the payload.
- Second iOS host live. Devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier receive a hidden exploit iframe.
- Mass clean-up begins.
- One of 188 snippets (TalkTalk) still infected.
Timeline as published by BreachHistory.1 A Smartsheet snippet was reinfected after cleaning, using a base64-encoded loader.
Payload behaviour and applicable directives
| Technique | Mechanism | Directive |
|---|---|---|
| Load the payload | Script element for https://1688360.cc/track.js, in plain form or decoded with atob() | script-src without 'strict-dynamic' |
| Run an inline copy | Full payload passed as a string to eval. Blocking the domain alone did not stop this variant. | script-src without 'unsafe-eval' |
| Card skimming | Luhn-valid numbers with expiry and CVV sent to /card.php by navigator.sendBeacon | connect-src |
| Cookie and screenshot capture | html2canvas loaded from the payload host. JPEG and up to 8,000 characters of cookies posted to /hit.php | script-src, connect-src. HttpOnly cookies were not readable. |
| iOS exploit delivery | Hidden iframe to .icu routers serving exploit kits by iOS version | frame-src |
| Cryptocurrency address replacement | Rewrites wallet addresses in page text, inputs, links and the clipboard | NONE Occurs in-page after execution |
Source for mechanisms: BreachHistory, citing Report URI.1 Hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen) were outside the skimmer's reach. First-party card fields were not. Researchers describe the iOS activity as observed delivery, not confirmed device compromise.
CSP outcome
Of the 15 page loads in the original disclosure, two were on sites whose CSP refused the loader with a script-src violation. The snippet was compromised there, but the payload did not execute.2 Reporting describes most affected sites as having no CSP, or a policy that permitted both the payload and the exfiltration.1,4
- Host trust was insufficient. The loader ran inside
cdn.optimizely.comcode, a host most affected sites had approved. A host allowlist trusts everything the host serves. 'strict-dynamic'and'unsafe-eval'each defeated otherwise restrictive policies. The first lets a trusted script add any script element. The second lets it execute strings.7,8connect-srcwas an independent control. Where the payload executed, a restrictiveconnect-srcstill prevented card and cookie data from leaving the page.- Reports provided detection. Sites that collected violation reports had a record of refused requests to
1688360.cc. - SRI was not applicable. The Optimizely snippet changes whenever a project is published, so an integrity hash cannot be pinned to it.9
- Payment pages carried the most exposure. PCI DSS 6.4.3 requires each payment-page script to have a written justification.10 Experimentation scripts on checkout pages are difficult to justify.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| Payload host | 1688360.cc (136.113.106.136). Paths /track.js, /card.php, /hit.php, /html2canvas.min.js |
| iOS router hosts | 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, eil786npto9u5bq.icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu |
| track.js SHA-256 (final build) | f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 |
| Browser markers | window._k7. sessionStorage keys prefixed cc_. data-channel-code="02111110" |
| Earlier wave (from 13 Nov) | webshell.lol/get.js, via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts |
From BreachHistory.1 The relationship between the 13 November wave and OPTIMJACK has not been established.
Response steps for Optimizely Web customers
Compiled from published guidance.1,6
- Audit Project JavaScript and experiment custom code in every project for
1688360,atob(,.icuand unrecognised script. - Review write access to the Optimizely account, including API tokens and integrations. Rotate credentials.
- Search proxy, DNS and CSP report logs for the hosts above from 04:00 UTC on 16 November. Preserve snippet change history.
- Request from Optimizely the project IDs modified and the times of modification.
- Treat card data entered in first-party fields on 16 November as potentially exposed. Rotate session tokens held in non-
HttpOnlycookies. - Restrict
connect-src, remove'unsafe-eval', enable reporting, and remove third-party tags from payment pages. Test a policy.
The question every affected site had to answer
Which of our pages trust this vendor, who owns that decision, and can we remove it today? Most organisations reconstructed the answer from templates, tag managers and email. CSP Ledger keeps it as a record for every source, with usage and violation evidence attached.
Part of a longer pattern
OPTIMJACK is the latest of several incidents that came through a policy's approved entries rather than around them, alongside British Airways (2018), Ticketmaster (2018), skimmers routed through Google Analytics (2020), Ledger Connect Kit (2023) and Polyfill.io (2024). Incidents 2018–2026.
Status of reporting
This page reflects sources published by 17 November 2026. Victim counts, the access vector and vendor statements remain subject to revision. Sources differ on whether Optimizely has issued a public statement.1,6
References
- [1]Optimizely supply-chain attack hits at least 178 organisations. BreachHistory, Nov 2026. Timeline, indicators of compromise and remediation steps. Cites Report URI's snippet scan.
- [2]CNN, Zoom, Fox News served visitors a crypto-stealing skimmer. Amirul Cyber, 16 Nov 2026. Original disclosure. Names the campaign OPTIMJACK.
- [3]Hackers infect 178 major websites via Optimizely to steal credit cards and target iPhones. Cyber Security News, Nov 2026.
- [4]OPTIMJACK Optimizely malware hits 178 brands. SecurityOnline, Nov 2026.
- [5]Malicious code served through Optimizely hit nearly 190 sites. daily.dev, Nov 2026.
- [6]Optimizely Web JavaScript breach: admin response. Windows Forum, Nov 2026.
- [7]Content Security Policy Level 3. W3C, Web Application Security Working Group. Working Draft. The normative definition of directives, source matching and fallback.
- [8]CSP: script-src. MDN Web Docs.
- [9]Subresource Integrity. W3C.
- [10]PCI DSS v4.0.1, Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1. PCI Security Standards Council. Payment-page script inventory, authorization and tamper detection. Mandatory from 31 March 2025.