Unmaintained policies: incidents 2018–2026
A Content Security Policy blocks what it does not list. The incidents below happened through what was listed: a trusted host serving new code, a domain that changed hands, a shared platform allowed for one purpose and used for another, a vendor script placed where it had no reason to be. A 2016 study of 26,011 policies found the same weakness at scale: most allowlisted script hosts could be used to bypass the policy.9
Each entry separates the reported facts, which are cited, from CSP Rules' analysis of where the policy came in.
Four failure patterns
| Pattern | Incidents | What fails | What a maintained record adds |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trusted code modified | British Airways, Ledger Connect Kit, OPTIMJACK (Optimizely) | An allowlist trusts everything a listed host serves. When the code at that host changes, the policy does not notice. | Scope per page, so a vendor runs only where it was approved. Violation evidence attached to each record. A vendor incident view listing every page and owner that trusts the vendor. |
| Allowlisted domain changes owner | Polyfill.io | An entry stays in the header after its reason has gone and after the domain has a new owner. | A justification and a review date on every entry. Unused or unexplained entries are retired on evidence. |
| Broad entry used to carry data out | Skimmers routed through Google Analytics | Allowing a shared service, such as an analytics or storage platform, allows any account on it, including an attacker's. | Review flags shared-service and wildcard hosts at request time and asks for the narrowest scope. |
| Unjustified script on a payment page | Ticketmaster UK | A third-party script runs where card data is entered, with no recorded reason for being there. | Scope that excludes payment pages by default. A written justification and an approval for any exception, as PCI DSS 6.4.3 requires. |
Timeline
Ticketmaster UK
UNJUSTIFIED SCRIPT ON A PAYMENT PAGEReportedA chatbot hosted by a third party ran on Ticketmaster's website, including its payment page. About 9.4 million customers were potentially affected by the breach.
In November 2020 the ICO fined Ticketmaster UK £1.25 million. It found the company "failed to negate the well-established risk of implementing third-party JavaScripts into a website", and said Subresource Integrity could have been used, or the chatbot kept off the payment page.
Sources: 3
Where the policy came inThe regulator's two remedies are both policy decisions: pin the script, or do not allow it on the payment page. Neither is visible in a header that simply lists the vendor's host.
British Airways
TRUSTED CODE MODIFIEDReportedBetween 14 and 25 August 2018 an attacker added 22 lines of JavaScript to the airline's payment pages. Card data was sent to an attacker-controlled site titled "BAways".
A third party alerted the airline on 5 September 2018. The UK Information Commissioner found the attacker could access data of 429,612 people, about 244,000 of them with card number, expiry date and CVV.
The ICO issued a final penalty of £20 million on 16 October 2020, down from an intended £183.39 million.
Where the policy came inThe skimmer ran inside the airline's own pages, so a script-src trusting the site's own origin would not have stopped it. The second line of defence is connect-src: a payment page that may only contact the services it needs refuses a request to a domain that is on no list.
Skimmers routed through Google Analytics
BROAD ENTRY USED TO CARRY DATA OUTReportedSansec found a skimmer on several dozen stores that ran entirely on Google infrastructure. The loader was hosted on firebasestorage.googleapis.com, and card data was encrypted and sent as events to an attacker-controlled Google Analytics account.
Sansec's conclusion: "Content-Security-Policy (CSP) will not work when a site administrator trusts Google."
Sources: 4
Where the policy came inThe allowlist entry was correct for its original purpose and still useful to the attacker. An entry for a shared platform trusts every account on that platform. Recording which property or path the site actually uses, and reviewing broad entries, narrows what an injected script can reach.
Ledger Connect Kit
TRUSTED CODE MODIFIEDReportedAn npm account able to publish the Ledger Connect Kit was taken over through phishing, and malicious versions 1.1.5 to 1.1.7 were published.
Applications loaded the Connect Kit at runtime from a CDN, so they received the malicious version without changing their own code. About five hours passed from compromise to resolution; funds were drained during a window of under two hours.
Sources: 5
Where the policy came inA policy that allows a package CDN's host trusts every version of every package published there. Pinning the exact path and version, with Subresource Integrity where the file is static, turns a silent upgrade into a blocked request.
Polyfill.io
ALLOWLISTED DOMAIN CHANGES OWNERReportedIn February 2024 a new owner bought the polyfill.io domain and its GitHub account. In June 2024 Sansec reported malware served from cdn.polyfill.io to more than 100,000 sites that embedded it.
The code redirected mobile visitors to a sports betting site, at specific hours, and stayed inactive for admin users. The original author advised that modern browsers no longer need the library at all.
Sources: 6
Where the policy came inThe entry outlived both its reason and its owner. Modern browsers had made the library unnecessary, and the domain had been sold four months before the malware was reported. A header records neither fact. A review date and a justification on the entry would have prompted the question of whether it was still needed.
OPTIMJACK (Optimizely)
TRUSTED CODE MODIFIEDReportedAttackers wrote JavaScript into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web projects, so Optimizely's CDN served it to visitors of about 178 organisations. The payload skimmed cards, stole cookies, swapped cryptocurrency addresses and served exploit pages to iPhones.
Of the 15 page loads in the original disclosure, two were on sites whose CSP refused the loader.
Where the policy came inThe loader came from a host nearly every affected site had approved. Sites with a narrow connect-src kept card data on the page even where the payload ran.
What they share
In each case the header said what was allowed and nothing else: not why, not by whom, not on which pages, and not until when. Subresource Integrity11 and a narrow connect-src would have limited several of these incidents, but both require someone to know what each entry is for. PCI DSS 6.4.3 now requires that record for payment-page scripts.10
A record for every entry
CSP Ledger keeps an owner, a justification, a scope, a review date and report evidence for each source in a policy, so that an entry's reason, and its expiry, are written down before the next incident asks for them.
References
- [1]
- [2]ICO finalizes 20M GBP fine against British Airways. IAPP, 16 Oct 2020.
- [3]Ticketmaster is fined £1.25m for data breach. Simmons & Simmons, 17 Nov 2020. Summary of the ICO penalty notice.
- [4]Digital skimmer runs entirely on Google, defeats CSP. Sansec, 22 Jun 2020.
- [5]
- [6]Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites. Sansec, 25 Jun 2024.
- [7]Optimizely supply-chain attack hits at least 178 organisations. BreachHistory, Nov 2026. Timeline, indicators of compromise and remediation steps. Cites Report URI's snippet scan.
- [8]CNN, Zoom, Fox News served visitors a crypto-stealing skimmer. Amirul Cyber, 16 Nov 2026. Original disclosure. Names the campaign OPTIMJACK.
- [9]CSP Is Dead, Long Live CSP! On the Insecurity of Whitelists and the Future of Content Security Policy. Weichselbaum, Spagnuolo, Lekies, Janc. ACM CCS, 2016. Analysis of 26,011 unique policies from 1,680,867 hosts.
- [10]PCI DSS v4.0.1, Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1. PCI Security Standards Council. Payment-page script inventory, authorization and tamper detection. Mandatory from 31 March 2025.
- [11]Subresource Integrity. W3C.